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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
In their brief, Respondents argue that there was no evidence 
presented at trial upon which any expert could have found that 
the timely arrival by Gold Cross Ambulance personnel would have 
made a difference in Ted Newsom's survivability. However, a 
review of the testimony presented at trial indicates that there 
was ample evidence upon which experts could have found that Mr. 
Newsom's chances of survival would have been enhanced. 
In their brief, Respondents cite three Utah cases for the 
proposition that Utah law does not allow recovery in a wrongful 
death case where the decedent's chance of survival was less than 
50%. However, these cases are easily distinguished from the case 
at bar because these cases involve issues and factual situations 
completely different than the facts and circumstances of the 
instant case. 
The Appellants' proposed jury instructions are in harmony 
with the theory of law being advocated by the Appellants on 
appeal inasmuch as the instructions state what must be proved by 
a plaintiff in a wrongful death cause of action even where the 
decedent's chance of survival is less than 50%. These instruc-
tions are standard Utah instructions and would be no different, 
regardless of the percentage of possibility of survival of the 
decedent. 
The Appellants are not advocating a new cause of action on 
appeal. The Appellants are advocating a theory of law which goes 
to the issue of proximate cause and how damages will be assessed 
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in a wrongful death case. The Appellant's theory of law was 
raised in a timely manner inasmuch as this issue was raised by 
both the Respondents and the Appellants in Respondent's Motion 
for Summary Judgment. In addition, the issue was raised once 
again when Appellants made their exceptions to the court's jury 
instructions. 
DETAIL OF THE ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THERE WAS SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE UPON WHICH THE JURY COULD 
HAVE FOUND THAT TED NEWSOM HAD SOME CHANCE OF SURVIVAL 
HAD THE GOLD CROSS AMBULANCE ARRIVED IN A TIMELY MANNER 
On Page 2 of their brief, Respondents state that Kevin Ray 
testified that upon arrival at the scene, Mr. Newsom had not 
vomited, nor was there any indication he had aspirated material 
into his lungs, and that it was minutes after his arrival that 
Mr. Newsom vomited. On Page 3 of their brief, Respondents state 
that based upon the factual information provided by Kevin Ray, 
all of the experts in the case, including the Appellants' expert, 
agreed that Mr. Newsomfs chances of survival were in no way 
dependent upon earlier advance life support inasmuch as at the 
time he vomited, aspirated material, and went into raspatory 
arrest, advance life support was available at the scene. On Page 
5 of their brief, Respondents state that Kevin Ray testified that 
when he arrived at the scene, there was nothing in the form of 
vomitus material and bile coming from the mouth or nose, and that 
decedent went into respiratory arrest and then for the first time 
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vomited. 
After reviewing these portions of Respondents1 brief, one 
would be led to the conclusion that there was no evidence 
presented at the time of trial which was in contradiction to the 
above facts as alleged by the Respondents. This is completely 
inaccurate. There was ample evidence presented at trial by the 
Appellants which verified that Mr. Newsom vomited and aspirated 
long before arrival of advance life support. In addition, the 
Respondents1 characterization of Kevin Ray's testimony is 
misleading. 
It is true that when Mr. Kevin Ray testified as a witness 
for the first time at trial, he gave testimony which seemed to 
indicate that there was no vomitus material when he arrived at 
the scene and that Mr. Newsom vomited for the first time after he 
began to examine Mr. Newsom. This part of Mr. Ray's testimony 
appears in the addendum of Respondents' Brief (R. 659 p.47). 
However, later in the trial, Kevin Ray was recalled as a witness 
and corrected his testimony, testifying that he, in fact, had no 
specific recollection as to whether or not there was any bile or 
vomitus material when he first started working on Mr. Newsom. 
(R.659 p. 58; attached as Appendix A.) Hhus, the jury had the 
prerogative of believing the testimony of Kevin Ray when he was 
first called as a witness, or believing the testimony of Mr. Ray 
when he was called as a witness for a second time, or disregard-
ing his testimony altogether. However, no one knows how the jury 
weighed his testimony. The jury could have easily found that Mr. 
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Ray had no recollection of whether or not vomitus material 
existed when he first arrived at the scene of the accident. 
It must also be brought to the attention of the court that 
the Appellants called Scott Hodgkinson to testify at the trial. 
Mr. Hodgkinson was a Midvale police officer who was dispatched to 
the scene and arrived at 3:59 p.m. Mr. Hodgkinson testified at 
trial that Mr. Newsom began to aspirate at 4:03 p.m. Officer 
Hodgkinson also testified that Mr. Newsom was choking or aspirat-
ing at 4:12 to 4:13 p.m. and that bile was coming out of his 
mouth. He further testifies that the paramedics arrived for the 
first time sometime thereafter. (R.659, p. 7-10, 16, 17; 
attached as Appendix B). This testimony presented at trial is in 
direct contradiction of the Respondents1 statements in their 
brief to the effect that there was no evidence presented at trial 
that Mr. Newsom aspirated prior to the time of arrival of advance 
life support. Therefore, there was ample, competent evidence 
upon which the Appellants' expert could have relied for his 
opinion. It should further be noted that the Respondents' own 
expert, Dr. Parry, was given a hypothetical based upon this 
evidence presented by the Appellants and Dr. Parry indicated that 
Mr. Newsom's chances of survival would have been better. (See 
Brief of the Appellants, p. 7.). 
In summary, the Respondents have attempted to argue that 
there was no factual basis upon which any expert could have 
relied in rendering an opinion that the arrival of the Gold Cross 
Ambulance in a timely manner would have made any difference at 
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all. However, Respondents1 argument is easily contradicted by 
the clear testimony presented at trial. 
POINT II 
THE UTAH CASES CITED BY THE RESPONDENT ARE NOT RELEVANT TO THE 
ISSUE AS TO WHETHER JURY INSTRUCTION NO. 20 REPRESENTS A 
CORRECT STATEMENT OF THE LAW 
The Respondent, in its brief, cites three Utah cases, 
Robinson v. Intermountain Health Care, 740 P.2d 2 62 (Utah App. 
1987), Nixdorf v. Hicken. 612 P.2d 348 (Utah 1980), and Marsh v. 
Pemberton, 10 Utah 2d 40, 347 P.2d 1108 (Utah 1959). These cases 
are cited for the proposition that Utah law requires evidence 
that the decedent had greater than a 50% chance of survival which 
was removed through the negligence of the tort feasor, before 
recovery can be had in a wrongful death action. However, these 
cases dealt with issues and factual situations totally different 
than the issues and factual situation before this court. 
Marsh v. Pemberton involved a lawsuit by a plaintiff against 
a medical doctor for negligent treatment. At trial, the plain-
tiff did not offer testimony of an independent medical expert to 
establish the standard of care. The plaintiff claimed that the 
jury could find negligence based upon their common knowledge and 
experience. At the close of plaintiff's evidence, the trial 
court dismissed the plaintiff's case with prejudice and the 
Supreme Court of Utah affirmed. The Supreme Court held that 
failure of the plaintiff to call an expert medical witness and 
establish a standard of care was fatal to the case. The Court 
stated: 
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To allow the question of negligence to be 
submitted to the jury without first estab-
lishing a standard of care would allow a jury 
to indulge in a type of speculation not 
generally allowed. (10 Utah 2d 40, 45, 347 
P.2d 1108, 1111) 
The facts and circumstances involved in Marsh are certainly 
much different than the facts and circumstances involved in the 
instant case. Marsh involved a situation where the plaintiff did 
not even bother to call an independent medical expert to estab-
lish a standard of care and his case was dismissed after the 
close of the evidence. In the instant case, expert testimony was 
submitted by the plaintiff on the question of negligence and the 
jury found negligence on the part of Gold Cross Ambulance. The 
facts of the two cases are so different that it would be diffi-
cult to apply general principles enunciated in Marsh to the facts 
and circumstances of the instant case. 
In Nixdorf v. Hicken, a medical doctor performed an opera-
tion on the plaintiff. During the operation, a needle become 
disengaged from the needle holder. The medical doctor looked for 
the needle, but was unable to locate the same. The patient was 
then sewed up, but was never informed about the lost needle. The 
trial court directed a verdict against the plaintiff because the 
plaintiff had produced no expert to establish a standard of care. 
The Supreme Court of Utah versed and remanded for a new trial, 
holding that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur was applicable and 
that no expert was necessary. In Robinson v. Intermountain 
Health Care, the plaintiff received a routine tonsillectomy and 
was given three shots in her hip during her stay at the hospital. 
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Later, the plaintiff developed septic shock (bacterial poisoning 
of the blood). The defendant moved for summary judgement with 
supporting affidavits of expert witnesses, stating that the 
infection was not caused by the injections. The plaintiff failed 
to provide any counter affidavits of expert witnesses and 
attempted to rely upon the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. The 
trial court granted summary judgment, and this Court affirmed, 
holding that expert testimony was necessary in this particular 
case. 
Again, the facts, circumstances and issues involved in 
Nixdorf and Robinson are totally different than the facts, 
issues, and circumstances of the instant case. In Nixdorf and 
Robinson, the issue before this court and the Supreme Court was 
the availability of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. 
Obviously, generalized general principles enunciated in these two 
decisions would serve little guidance in determining the issue 
before this Court. 
POINT III 
THE JURY INSTRUCTIONS PROPOSED BY THE APPELLANTS ARE IN HARMONY 
WITH THE THEORY OF LAW BEING ADVOCATED BY THE 
APPELLANTS ON APPEAL 
In their brief, Respondents cite three jury instructions 
proposed by the Appellants, two of which were adopted by the 
trial court in its instructions to the jury. The Respondents 
contend that these instructions offer in substance the same 
theory of law as now being challenged by the Appellants on 
appeal. However, this is not accurate. These instructions are 
8 
perfectly in harmony with the theory of law as being advocated by 
the Appellants on appeal. These instructions are standard 
instructions dealing with the definition of negligence, proximate 
cause and the burden of proof. These instructions are perfectly 
consistent with Appellant's contention that the heirs in a 
wrongful death case should be entitled to recover where the 
decedent was deprived of a certain percentage of survivability, 
removed by the tort-feasor, which was less than 50%. As in any 
case dealing with negligence, the plaintiff must first prove 
negligence and that the negligence was the proximate cause of the 
loss of chance of survival. The plaintiff must also show the 
elements of proximate cause as enunciated in the standard 
instruction in Utah for proximate cause. In addition, the 
plaintiff must also show by a preponderance of the evidence that 
the decedent was deprived of the percentage of possibility of 
survival as alleged by the plaintiff. In other words, if 
plaintiff presents evidence that there was a percentage of 
possibility of survival less than 50%, he is still under the 
obligation to show that the loss was caused by negligence, as 
defined by Utah law, and that such negligence was the proximate 
cause of the loss. In addition, all of these elements must be 
proved by a preponderance of the evidence presented at trial. 
The plaintiff's proposed jury instructions are in complete 
harmony with the theory of law being advocated by the Appellants, 
butthe trial cruct's JLnyIrebxcdcnND.20isn±. 
9 
POINT IV 
THE APPELLANTS ARE NOT RAISING A NEW CAUSE OF ACTION NOR A NEW 
ISSUE ON APPEAL. 
The Respondents argue that Appellants1 theory of law is 
somehow a new cause of action which is unknown in the state of 
Utah and that the Appellants were under some type of obligation 
to specify this theory of law in their complaint. However, 
Appellants1 objection to Jury Instruction No. 20 certainly does 
not rise to the level of advocating a new cause of action. The 
only cause of action Appellants have ever alleged is a wrongful 
death cause of action based on common law negligence. The 
plaintiffs1 objection to Jury Instruction No. 20 has to do with 
proximate cause and how damages will be assessed in a wrongful 
death cause of action. There needs to be no citation of author-
ity for the proposition that the state of Utah has adopted notice 
pleading. The Appellants certainly were not under an obligation 
to specify in their complaint every minute detail of law which 
might potentially be involved in the prosecution of their case. 
Moreover, the Appellants theory of how damages should be assessed 
in a wrongful death case was brought to the attention of the 
trial court and the Respondents long before trial as well as when 
exceptions to the court's jury instructions were taken at trial. 
Before the case went to trial, defendants moved for summary 
judgment. In the Respondent's Memorandum in Support of Defen-
dant's Motion for Summary Judgment, the Respondents raised the 
issue of insufficiency of evidence to justify a causal link 
between negligence on the part of Gold Cross personnel, and the 
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survivability of Ted Newsom. (R. 86 - 89). In the Appellants1 
Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Summary 
Judgment, the plaintiffs cited Brown v. Johnson. 24 Utah 2d 388, 
472 P.2d 942 (Utah 1970) and stated as follows: 
In Brown v. Johnson ...the plaintiff sus-
tained injuries arising out of an automobile 
accident. The evidence indicated that the 
plaintiff had a 15% chance of requiring 
future surgery. The Court held that the 
plaintiff could recover damages, and that the 
value to be place upon the percentage was for 
the jury to determine. (R. 163-164, attached 
on Appendix C). 
The Appellants then noted that their expert witness, Dr. 
Frank Yanowitz had stated in his affidavit that Mr. Newsom would 
have had approximately a 50% to 100% chance of survival had 
appropriate medical treatment been available to Mr. Newsom in a 
timely manner. (R. 164, attached as Appendix C). 
The Appellants in their Memorandum then stated: 
Although it is impossible to determine with 
absolute certainty that had Mr. Ted Newsom 
been given prompt medical attention that he 
would have lived, it is possible to say, 
based upon reasonable medical certainty, that 
Mr. Newsom1s chances of survival would have 
been significantly and substantially improved 
had prompt medical attention been administer-
ed. Therefore, there is a close enough nexus 
between the alleged wrongful acts of the 
defendant and the death of Mr. Ted Newsom, 
that a jury should be given an opportunity to 
consider the evidence and make a final 
determination on the merits. (R. 165, 
attached as Appendix C). 
When Appellants made their exceptions to the trial court's 
jury instructions, the Appellants cited the case of Brown v. 
Johnson once again as follows: 
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I'm taking exception to the Court's Instruc-
tion No. 20 based upon the case of Brown v. 
Johnson, a Utah Supreme Court case. The 
citation is 472 P.2d 942. We believe that 
this particular case sets the proper rule for 
proximate cause in this case as opposed to 
Instruction No. 20 which we feel is not a 
proper statement of the law of proximate 
cause in this case. (R. 658, p. 159, 
attached as Appendix D). 
CONCLUSION AND RELIEF SOUGHT 
There was sufficient evidence presented at trial upon which 
a jury could have found that Ted Newsom had a chance of survival 
which was less than 50%, which chance was removed by the negli-
gence of Gold Cross Ambulance. The rule that recovery can be had 
in a wrongful death cause of action, where the chance of survival 
is less than 50%, is the better reasoned view. The Utah case of 
Brown v. Johnson establishes this rule of law. Traditional 
negligence and proximate cause rules adopted in the state of Utah 
are still applicable. The plaintiff must prove by a preponder-
ance of the evidence that the loss of chance of survival was the 
proximate cause of negligence on the part of the tort-feasor. 
In addition, the issue before this court was raised in a timely 
manner by the Appellants long before trial as well as during the 
trial. 
The Appellants respectively request that the judgment of the 
trial court be reversed as to the issue of proximate cause and 
damages and that the case be remanded for a new trial solely on 
the issue of proximate cause and damages. 
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DATED this / 7 day of <^ C f - , 1988. 
PARKER, McKEOWN & McCONKIE 
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TO WORK ON HIM YOU DIDN'T REMEMBER SEEING ANY BILE OR 
JUICE IN THE MOUTH AT THAT TIME; IS THAT CORRECT? 
A NOT THAT I CAN RECALL. 
Q OKAY. NOW, CAN YOU, IN FACT, REMEMBER WHETHER 
YOU SAW BILE IN HIS MOUTH OR ANY MATTER OR MATERIAL BEFORE 
YOU STARTED WORKING ON HIM OR AFTER? DO YOU HAVE A 
SPECIFIC RECOLLECTION OF THAT? 
A NO, I DON'T. I CAN'T REMEMBER THAT AT ALL. 
Q YOU CAN'T REMEMBER EITHER WAY? 
A NO. THINGS HAPPENED SO FAST THAT I DON'T 
REMEMBER, HARDLY. 
MR. MCCONKIE: I HAVE NOTHING FURTHER, YOUR 
HONOR. 
MR. HAYES: JUST BRIEFLY. 
RECROSS-EXAMINATION 
BY MR. HAYES: 
Q MR. RAY, THIS ONE MINUTE, I THINK THAT'S, AS 
YOU UNDERSTAND, THE REASON YOU WERE CALLED BACK, IS TO 
OFFER SOME EVIDENCE OF THAT TIME IT TAKES TO MOVE THE 
PATIENT OUT OF THE CAFE INTO THE AMBULANCE? 
A YES. 
Q IS THAT WHY YOU WERE TOLD YOU WERE ASKED TO 
COME BACK AND ESTABLISH THAT? 
A YES. 
Q IN A SITUATION WHERE YOU ARRIVE ON THE SCENE 
APPENDIX A 58 
A HE WAS SEMICONSCIOUS. 
Q DID YOU NOTICE WHETHER OR NOT HE WAS MAKING ANY 
ATTEMPT TO SPEAK? 
A HE WAS, BUT HIS WORDS WERE GARBLED. 
Q DID YOU NOTICE ANYTHING ABOUT HIS BREATHING? 
A IT WAS LABORED. 
Q I WILL PUT "GARBLED SPEECH, LABORED BREATHING" 
ON PLAINTIFFS' EXHIBIT NO. 6. I GUESS THAT IS INTRODUCED. 
DO YOU RECALL ANYTHING ABOUT HIS EYES? WERE 
THEY OPENED OR CLOSED? 
A THEY WERE OPEN AT THAT TIME. 
Q COULD YOU DESCRIBE WHAT YOU OBSERVED AS TIME 
PROGRESSED AND TO THE BEST OF YOUR RECOLLECTION. I KNOW 
TIMES ARE APPROXIMATELY, BUT TO THE BEST OF YOUR 
RECOLLECTION GIVE THE JURY AN IDEA OF WHAT YOU OBSERVED 
ABOUT TED NEWSOM'S MEDICAL CONDITION AS TIME PROGRESSED. 
A AS TIME PROGRESSED HIS BREATHING BECAME MORE 
LABORED. HE HAD A HARD TIME GETTING HIS BREATH. HIS 
EYES WERE SHUT AND HE WOULD STOP BREATHING UNTIL I WOULD 
TAP HIM ON THE FACE, AND THEN HE WOULD GASP FOR AIR AND 
START HIS LABORED BREATHING AGAIN. 
Q I RECOGNIZE I'M ASKING FOR APPROXIMATE TIMES, 
BUT CAN YOU PUT A TIME ON THAT WHEN YOU WERE TAPPING HIM 
ON THE FACE? 
A APPROXIMATELY 4:05. 
APPENDIX B 7 
Q I WILL PUT "TAPPED TED ON THE FACE TO KEEP HIM 
BREATHING." IS THAT CORRECT? 
A YES. 
Q COULD YOU CONTINUE TO TELL US WHAT YOU OBSERVED 
AFTER THAT POINT IN TIME? 
A FROM THAT POINT ON HE PROGRESSIVELY GOT WORSE 
AND HE THEN BEGAN TO CHOKE AS THOUGH HE HAD SOMETHING IN 
HIS THROAT. AT THAT POINT IN TIME I TURNED HIM ON HIS 
SIDE, AT WHICH POINT BILE OR SUBSTANCE CAME FROM HIS 
NOSE AND MOUTH. 
Q LET ME ASK YOU A COUPLE QUESTIONS ABOUT THAT. 
CAN YOU PINPOINT THE TIME THAT HE STARTED TO CHOKE? 
A IT WAS APPROXIMATELY MAYBE ONE OR TWO MINUTES 
AFTER WE HAD REQUESTED THE MI OVALE AMBULANCE TO BE 
DISPATCHED. 
Q AND DO YOU RECALL WHAT TIME THAT WAS? 
A THE AMBULANCE WAS DISPATCHED AT kill, SO IT HAD 
TO BE ABOUT 4:12 TO 4:1'?. 
Q I WILL PUT "4:12-13." I WILL PUT "CHOKED." 
YOU DESCRIBED BILE COMING OUT OF HIS MOUTH? 
A YES. 
Q DID IT COME SOLELY FROM HIS MOUTH? 
A NO. SOME OF IT CAME FROM HIS NOSE AS WELL. 
Q CAN YOU DESCRIBE HOW MUCH? 
A IT WAS ENOUGH TO COVER APPROXIMATELY A 
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FOUR- TO FIVE-INCH CIRCLE ON THE FLOOR. 
Q NOW, YOU SAID YOU TURNED HIM ON HIS SIDE; IS 
THAT CORRECT? 
A YES, I DID. 
Q WHY DID YOU DO THAT? 
A IT OPENS IT UP, ALLOWS THE LIQUID TO DRAIN, 
UNLESS — OPENING THE AIRWAYS SO HE COULD BREATHE. 
Q IS THERE A TECHNICAL TERM FOR THAT, WHAT WAS 
OCCURRING? 
A IT'S BEEN SO LONG. I'M NOT SURE I COULD 
REMEMBER A TECHNICAL TERM FOR IT. 
Q COULD YOU DESCRIBE THIS AS ASPIRATION? 
A YES. 
Q COULD YOU DESCRIBE THAT TO THE JURY, WHAT 
ASPIRATION IS, IF YOU KNOW. 
A IT IS WHERE THE VICTIM STARTS TO CHOKE ON THEIR 
OWN BODY LIQUIDS AND/OR AN OBJECT. 
Q OKAY. NOW, DID YOU HAVE ANY EQUIPMENT THAT, 
AT THE TIME TO HELP HIM, WHEN TED NEWSOM BEGAN TO 
ASPIRATE? 
A NO, I DID NOT. 
Q WOULD SOME EQUIPMENT HAVE BEEN HELPFUL? 
A YES. 
Q WHAT KIND OF EQUIPMENT WOULD HAVE BEEN HELPFUL? 
A AN AIRWAY, AND ALSO AN ASPIRATOR WHICH IS A 
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MACHINE WHICH WOULD SUCK THE BILE MATERIAL OUT OF HIS 
AIRWAY. 
Q CAN YOU DESCRIBE WHAT AN ASPIRATOR IS. 
A BASICALLY A SUCTION DEVICE WHICH HOOKS UP TO 
THE AIRWAY OR IT CAN BE PUT DOWN SEPARATELY, EITHER WAY, 
AND IT SUCKS THE SUBSTANCES FROM THE THROAT OR THE 
AIRWAY OF THE VICTIM. 
Q WHAT DOES IT LOOK LIKE? 
A IT'S IN A BOX ABOUT LIKE THIS WITH SOME TUBES 
AND STUFF IN IT TO CREATE THE SUCTION. 
Q ARE EMT'S, AS YOU DESCRIBE THEM, TRAINED TO 
USE ASPIRATOR EQUIPMENT? 
A WHEN I WENT THROUGH MY TRAINING THEY SHOWED US 
HOW TO USE THEM. 
Q DO YOU HAVE A RECOLLECTION OF WHEN THE 
AMBULANCES ARRIVED? 
A TO GIVE YOU AN EXACT TIME THERE I WOULD HAVE 
TO REFER TO MY DISPATCH LOGS; BUT I DO REMEMBER WHEN 
THEY ARRIVED, YES. 
Q AND COULD YOU TELL ME APPROXIMATELY WHAT YOUR 
RECOLLECTION IS. 
A THE PARAMEDICS AND THE AMBULANCE ARRIVED AT 
APPROXIMATELY THE SAME TIME, AND IT WOULD HAVE BEEN 
PROBABLY AROUND 4:20, 4:25, SOMEWHERE IN THERE. 
Q NOW, WHEN DID YOU LEAVE THE AREA? 
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WAS, YOU NEVER CHARACTERIZED THAT OR YOU NEVER BELIEVED 
THAT IT WAS VOMIT? 
A NOT TO MY KNOWLEDGE, NO. 
Q IN YOUR DEPOSITION YOU USE THE TERM "THROW UP." 
I ASSUME WE'RE ALL SPEAKING ABOUT THE SAME THING. HE 
DID NOT THROW UP? IS THAT RIGHT? 
A TO MY KNOWLEDGE, NO. 
Q I WENT THROUGH THIS ENTIRE REPORT AND COULDN'T 
FIND ANYWHERE ABOUT HIM CHOKING. I NEED TO KNOW, SINCE 
YOU REFRESHED YOUR RECOLLECTION AND DON'T HAVE AN 
INDEPENDENT RECOLLECTION OF THIS EVENT, WHAT IT WAS THAT 
REFRESHED YOUR RECOLLECTION THAT HE HAD CHOKED AT THIS 
TIME? 
A CHOKING AND ASPIRATE ARE BASICALLY THE SAME 
THING. AND IN HERE I HAVE — THE WAY I READ IT IS: 
"SERGEANT MASON THEN ARRIVED AND ASSISTED R/O. VICTIM 
WAS BEGINNING TO HAVE A HARDER TIME BREATHING, THEN 
BEGAN TO ASPIRATE," OR CHOKE, SAME THING. 
Q SO, YOU JUST INDICATED THIS CHOKING AND 
ASPIRATING? 
A YES, SIR. 
Q AND YOU HAVE DONE THAT WITH REFERENCE TO WHEN 
SERGEANT MASON ARRIVED? 
A YES, SIR. 
Q ISN'T IT TRUE THAT SERGEANT MASON ARRIVED ABOUT 
16 
1603 OR 3 
A 
Q 
1603? 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
MINUTES AFTER THE HOUR? 
IT WAS ABOUT THE TIME THAT I ARRIVED, YES, SIR. 
ARE YOU TELLING US THAT HE WAS ASPIRATING AT 
HE BEGAN TO ASPIRATE ABOUT THAT TIME. 
OR THIS CHOKING? 
YES, SIR. 
BUT YOU DIDN'T TURN HIM ONTO HIS SIDE UNTIL 
TEN MINUTES LATER? 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
HAVE DONE 
IT WAS — 
1612, 1613? 
OKAY. 
IS THAT CONSISTENT IN YOUR MIND, THAT YOU WOULD 
THAT, SOMEONE THAT WAS TRAINED AS AN EMT, THAT 
IF HE NEEDED THAT KIND OF CARE YOU WOULD HAVE WAITED? 
A 
Q 
THE FACE 
NECESSARY 
NO, SIR. 
ISN'T IT TRUE THAT AS YOU WERE TAPPING HIM ON 
AND DOING THOSE THINGS THAT YOU FELT WERE 
TO KEEP HIM BREATHING THAT YOU BELIEVED HE HAD 
AN AIR PASSAGE, AN AIRWAY? 
A 
Q 
OF TIME, 
A 
Q 
YES, SIR. 
AND THAT WAS YOUR PURPOSE DURING THAT PERIOD 
TO KEEP HIM BREATHING? 
YES, SIR. 
IN ALL FAIRNESS TO YOU, OFFICER, ISN'T IT TRUE 
17 
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11. That as a result of the foregoing, the Gold Cross 
ambulance crew failed to respond to calls dispatched "as rapidly 
as possible11 in contravention of the Gold Cross Ambulance 
Policies and Procedures Manual. (See Undisputed Fact No. 67.) 
It is clear that Gold Cross not only contravened their own 
internal policies and procedures but their employeefs course of 
behavior also violated the general duty of care required by the 
providers of ambulance services as set out in the Utah Emergency 
Medical Services System Act, 2 6 UCA 8 et seq. as well as the 
accompanying Ambulance Regulations and Standards as promulgated 
by the State of Utah Department of Health. Gold Cross1 actions 
also contravene the protocols as set forth by the Salt Lake EMS 
District Interhospital/EMS Council. In a situation where 
negligence is likely to result in a life and death situation, the 
defendant should be held to the highest standards reasonable 
under the circumstances. 
POINT VIII - IT IS PROBABLE THAT THE LIFE OF TED NEWSOM COULD 
HAVE BEEN SAVED HAD GOLD CROSS ARRIVED AT THE SCENE IN 
A TIMELY MANNER, RENDERED EMERGENCY MEDICAL CARE, AND 
TRANSPORTED TED NEWSOM TO COTTONWOOD HOSPITAL 
In Brown v, Johnson, 472 P.2d 942 (Utah 1970), the plaintiff 
sustained injuries arising out of an automobile accident. The 
evidence indicated that the plaintiff had a 15% chance of 
requiring future surgery. The Court held that the plaintiff could 
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APPENDIX C 
recover damages, and that the value to be placed upon the 
percentage was for the jury to determine. 
Dr. Frank G.Yanowitz, M.D., is an Associate Professor of 
Medicine at the University of Utah, College of Medicine and in 
addition is the Medical Director of the Fitness Institute at the 
LDS Hospital. He has extensive practical and research experience 
in the area of cardiology. Based upon his review of all medical 
records, statements and depositions of persons at the place where 
Mr. Ted Newsom collapsed, which persons described Mr. Newsom's 
physical condition and other information all relating to the 
medical status of the deceased, Dr. Yanowitz concluded that: 
a. Mr. Ted Newsom had a cardiac event on the day in 
question; 
b. that the cardiac event resulted in Mr. Newsom's death; 
and 
c. that had Mr. Ted Newsom been treated by EMTs with the 
proper medical equipment - suction device or aspirator 
- prior to the deceased aspiration and had Mr. Ted 
Newsom been treated by paramedics or an emergency room 
physician at the emergency room of the Cottonwood 
Hospital prior to the deceased subsequent cardiac 
arrest, he would have had approximately a 50% to 100% 
better chance of survival. (See Exhibit B, Affidavit 
of Dr. Frank G. Yanowitz, appended.) 
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Although it is impossible to determine with absolute 
certainty that had Mr. Ted Nevsom been given prompt medical 
attention that he would have lived, it is possible to say, 
based upon a reasonable medical certainty, that Mr. Newsomvs 
chances of survival would have been significantly and substan-
tially improved had prompt medical attention been administered. 
Therefore, there is a close enough nexus between the alleged 
wrongful acts of the defendant and the death of Mr. Ted Newsom, 
that a jury should be given an opportunity to consider the 
evidence and make a final determination on the merits. 
POINT IX - U.C.A. 26-8-11 IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL 
U.C.A. Section 26-8-11 is unconstitutional as being in 
violation of the following provisions of the Utah State Constitu-
tion: the Open Courts Clause of Article I, Section 7; the Equal 
Protection Provision of Article I, Section 22; and the prohibi-
tion against abrogation of wrongful death actions in Article XVI, 
Section 5. See Berrv v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 25 Utah 
Adv. Rep. 30 (1986). 
Conclusion 
For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff asks this Court to deny 
Defendants Motion for Summary Judgment. 
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1 SALT LAKE C I T Y , UTAH; MONDAY, SEPTEMBER 14 , 1 9 8 7 ; 7 :00 P.M 
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4 MR. BUNNELL: I ' M RANDALL BUNNELL FOR THE 
5 P L A I N T I F F S . 
6 I ' M TAKING EXCEPTION TO THE COURT'S INSTRUCTION 
7 NO. 20 BASED UPON THE CASE OF BROWN VERSUS JOHNSON. A 
I *mm*m~^ ill' l imt^mmmmmmi tm n w in • • i l i m ii m* 
8 UTAH SUPREME COURT CASE. THE CITATION IS 472 P.2D 9 4 2 . 
9 WE BELIEVE THAT THIS PARTICULAR CASE SETS 'THE PROPER 
10 RULE FOR PROXIMATE CAUSE IN THIS CASE AS OPPOSED TO 
11 INSTRUCTION NO. 20 WHICH WE FEEL IS NOT A PROPER STATEMENT 
12 OF THE LAW OF PROXIMATE CAUSE IN THIS CASE,, 
13 | THAT'S ALL WE HAVE, 
14 
15 | " " « 
16 
17 
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